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a b s t r a c t
Classical results in economics show that no truthful mechanism can achieve budget
balance and efficiency simultaneously. Roughgarden and Sundararajan recently proposed
an alternative efficiency measure, which was subsequently used to exhibit that many
previously known cost sharing mechanisms approximate both budget balance and
efficiency. In this work, we investigate cost sharing mechanisms for combinatorial
optimization problems using this novel efficiency measure, with a particular focus on
scheduling problems. Our contribution is threefold: First, for a large class of optimization
problems that satisfy a certain cost-stability property, we prove that no budget balanced
Moulin mechanism can approximate efficiency better than Ω(log n), where n denotes the
number of players in the universe. Second, we present a group-strategyproof cost sharing
mechanism for the minimum makespan scheduling problem that is tight with respect
to budget balance and efficiency. Finally, we show a general lower bound on the budget
balance factor for cost sharing methods, which can be used to prove a lower bound ofΩ(n)
on the budget balance factor for completion and flow time scheduling objectives.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many combinatorial optimization problems are concerned with establishing a good or service at a minimum cost. Often,
these problems can be viewed as consisting of a set of users (or agents, players) that act strategically in order to receive this
service. For instance, in network design problems, users wish to be connected to a network or a specific point of interest.
In routing problems, agents want their goods or information to be transferred from one point to another. In the scheduling
context, we can imagine bothmachines or jobs to be owned by agents who follow their selfish interests. In all these settings,
the problem is, besides finding a way of providing the service, to distribute the resulting cost among the users in a fair
manner. Meanwhile, the service provider may not be able to offer the service to the entire user set and must therefore
decide upon a subset of users that are served.
In this paper, we study cost sharing mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems, with a particular focus on
scheduling problems. The general setting is as follows. We are given a set U of n players that are interested in a certain
service. Every player i ∈ U has a private utility ui ≥ 0 for receiving this service and announces a bid bi ≥ 0 which designates
themaximum price she is willing to pay. Associated with the underlying optimization problem, we are given a cost function
C : 2U → R+ describing the minimum cost of serving a set of players S ⊆ U.
A cost sharing mechanism M first solicits all bids {bi}i∈U from players in U, and based on these bids (i) determines a set
S ⊆ U of players that receive the service, and (ii) for every player i ∈ S, fixes a non-negative payment xi(S) that she has to
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pay for the service. This payment is usually referred to as the cost share of a player i ∈ S. We assume that the mechanism
complies with the following three natural assumptions: (i) a player is not charged more than her bid, (ii) a player is charged
only if she receives service, and (iii) a player is guaranteed to receive service if she reports a sufficiently high bid.
Define the benefit of a player i as ui − xi if i receives service and as zero otherwise. We assume that each player’s strategy
is to maximize her benefit. Since the outcome computed by the cost sharingmechanism depends on the bids {bi}i∈U , a player
may have an incentive to misreport her actual utility, i.e., to declare a bid bi 6= ui, if advantageous.
There are several desirable properties of a cost sharing mechanism: A cost sharing mechanism M is called strategyproof
if bidding truthfully, i.e., announcing bi = ui, is a dominant strategy for every player. If this is true even if players collude,
then we call a mechanism group-strategyproof. A mechanism is β-budget balanced if the sum of the cost shares charged to
the players in S deviates by at most a factor β ≥ 1 from the actual cost C(S), i.e.,
1
β
· C(S) ≤∑
i∈S
xi(S) ≤ C(S). (1)
We say that the cost shares satisfy β-cost recovery if the first inequality holds; they are competitive if the latter inequality is
fulfilled. For a set S ⊆ U, define u(S) :=∑i∈S ui. A cost sharing mechanismM is called efficient if it selects a set of players that
maximizes the social welfare u(S)− C(S).
Classical results in economics [1,2] state that no truthful mechanism can approximate budget balance and efficiency
simultaneously; even for simple cost functions and if only strategyproofness is required. As a consequence, most of
the previous work has concentrated on either achieving budget balance or efficiency. Very recently, Roughgarden and
Sundararajan [3] introduced an alternative efficiency measure that attempts to circumvent these intractability results. They
define the social cost of a set S ⊆ U as Π (S) := u(U \ S)+ C(S). A mechanism is said to be α-approximate if the set of players
it determines has social cost at most α times the minimum social cost (over all subsets of U). It is not hard to see that a set S
minimizes the social cost iff it maximizes the social welfare.
A large class of group-strategyproof cost sharingmechanisms are so-calledMoulinmechanisms, based on a framework due
to Moulin and Shenker [4]. This framework provides a means to obtain group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms from
cross-monotonic cost sharing methods (definitions are given below). Moreover, Immorlica et al. [5] prove that every group-
strategyproof cost sharing mechanism (satisfying some natural conditions) corresponds to a cross-monotonic cost sharing
method. Roughgarden and Sundararajan [3] revealed a relation between the approximability of a Moulin mechanism and a
property of the underlying cost sharing method, which they termed α-summability (definition is given below).
One focus of this paper is on cost sharing mechanisms for parallel machine scheduling problems. In the classical setting,
we are given a set N of jobs that have to be executed on m parallel machines. The goal is to assign all jobs to the machines
such that a certain objective function, such as the makespan or the sum of all completion times, is minimized. In the cost
sharing context, we assume that every job is owned by a player who acts strategically in order to get his job processed
at a low cost. Here, the cost that is to be distributed among the players depends on the respective objective function. It is
very natural to suppose that the cost incurred by the service provider is the amount of time that he needs until all jobs are
completed, leading to the minimummakespan cost function. However, one can also imagine that the service provider aims
at minimizing the total time that jobs spend in the system or other completion time related objective functions.
1.1. Our results
In this paper, we study cost sharingmethods for optimization problems in light of the new efficiencymeasure introduced
by Roughgarden and Sundararajan [3]. Our contribution is threefold:
1. Lower bound on approximability of cost sharing mechanisms. We present a general inapproximability result for cost
sharing methods for combinatorial optimization problems. In particular, we prove that there is no cost sharing method that
is α-summable and satisfies β-cost recovery for any α < Hn/β, where n denotes the number of players. Our proof holds if
the underlying cost function satisfies a certain cost-stability property. As a consequence, our result implies a lower bound
of Ω(log n) on the approximability of Moulin mechanisms for various optimization problems, such as, for instance, facility
location, minimum spanning tree (and thus also minimum Steiner tree and forest), single-source rent-or-buy, minimum
makespan scheduling, etc. Despite its generality, our lower bound is tight for some specific problems such as facility location
and minimummakespan scheduling.
2. Optimal cost sharing method for makespan scheduling.We study theminimum makespan scheduling problem, one of the
most fundamental problems in scheduling theory, in a cost sharing context. In this problem, we are given a set of jobs N,
each of which is owned by a selfish player. The objective is to assign the chosen set of jobs to m parallel machines such that
the maximum completion time is minimized. We develop a cross-monotonic cost sharing method for this problem which
is (2 − 1/m)-budget balanced and (Hn + 1)-approximate. With a slightly refined analysis, one can show that our method
achieves a budget balance factor of 2− 2/(m+ 1); this is tight with respect to both budget balance and approximability.
Related to this result is the recent work of Bleischwitz and Monien [6]. The authors present a cross-monotonic (2 − 2/
(m + 1))-budget balanced cost sharing method for the minimum makespan scheduling problem. However, as we argue
below, their cost sharing mechanism does not approximate social cost.
3. Lower bound on budget balance of cost sharing mechanisms. We present a generic lower bound showing that no cross-
monotonic and β-budget balanced cost sharing method exists for any β < f (n), where f is a function that measures the
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maximum rate of increase of the underlying cost function C. For example, for every fixed player set, f is at least the ratio
between the cost of the whole set and the sum of the costs of all its singleton subsets. We prove that this lower bound even
holds for cost sharing methods in the β-core (definition is given below). We use this general approach to prove negative
results for several fundamental scheduling problems in a cost sharing context. Namely, we show a lower bound of Ω(n)
on the budget balance factor of cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for all scheduling problems in which we aim at
minimizing the total (weighted) completion (or flow) time.Weprove that the samebound also applies to average (weighted)
completion (or flow) time objectives.
1.2. Previous and related work
The development of cost sharing mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems has recently attracted a lot of
attention in the theoretical computer science literature.
The framework ofMoulin and Shenker [4] has been applied to game-theoretic variants of classical optimization problems
such as fixed tree multicast [7–9], submodular cost sharing [4], Steiner trees [10,11], facility location, single-source rent-
or-buy network design [12–14] and Steiner forests [15]. Lower bounds on the budget balance factor that is achievable by a
cross-monotonic cost sharing mechanism are given in [5,16]. Very recently, researchers started to investigate cost sharing
mechanisms in light of the novel efficiency measure of Roughgarden and Sundararajan; see [3,17–19].
The problem of scheduling independent jobs on parallel machines is well-studied for various objective functions. The
minimum makespan version P| |Cmax is shown to be NP-complete by Garey and Johnson [20]. Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos
gave a PTAS for this problem [21]. The minimumweighted completion time (P| |∑i wiCi) and average weighted completion
time (P| |∑i wiCi/n) scheduling problems are also NP-complete as proved by Lenstra [22]. A PTAS for both problems has
been given in [23]. However, for unit processing times or equal weights, all three problems are polynomially solvable [24,
25].
Very notably, although network design problems have been studied extensively in a cost sharing context, very little
attention has been given to scheduling problems; in particular if jobs are assumed to act strategically, and group-
strategyproofness is a desirable objective. In most of the previous works, authors have either concentrated on scheduling
problems where machines act selfishly [26–28], or strategyproofness (but not group-strategyproofness) is an issue [29,30].
After the publication of this paper, substantial progress has been made in the theory of cost sharing mechanisms.
Mehta, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [31] introduced a new class of cost sharing mechanisms called acyclic mechanisms.
These mechanisms generalize Moulin mechanisms and as such leave more flexibility to improve upon the approximation
guarantees with respect to budget balance and social cost. However, they achieve a slightly weaker notion of truthfulness
called weak group-strategyproofness. A mechanism is weakly group-strategyproof [31,32] if no coordinated bidding of a
coalition S ⊆ U can ever strictly increase the utility of every player in S. For scheduling problems with completion time
related objectives, Brenner and Schäfer [33] define acyclicmechanismswith constant approximation factors for both budget
balance and social cost. These results are in sharp contrast with the lower bounds for Moulin mechanisms that we prove in
this paper.
1.3. Organization of paper
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce some additional notation and concepts that are used in
subsequent sections. The general lower bound on the approximability of cost sharing mechanisms is presented in Section 3.
Our tight cost sharing mechanism for the minimum makespan scheduling is given in Section 4. The negative results with
respect to approximating the budget balance factor for certain cost functions together with its applications to completion
time related scheduling problems is stated in Section 5. Finally, we offer some conclusions in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Moulin mechanisms
A cost sharing method ξ is a function ξ : U × 2U → R+ that assigns to each user i ∈ U and subset S ⊆ U a non-negative
cost share ξ(i, S). We define ξ(i, S) := 0 for all i ∈ U \ S, for all S ⊆ U. ξ is cross-monotonic if the cost share of a player does
not increase as the player set grows; more formally, for all S′ ⊆ S ⊆ U and for every i ∈ S′, it holds that ξ(i, S′) ≥ ξ(i, S).
Similar to the definition in (1), ξ is β-budget balanced if
∀S ⊆ U : 1
β
· C(S) ≤∑
i∈S
ξ(i, S) ≤ C(S).
We say that ξ satisfies β-cost recovery if the first inequality holds; it is competitive if the latter inequality is fulfilled. If β = 1,
we simply call the cost sharing mechanism budget balanced.
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Moulin and Shenker [4] showed that, given a budget balanced and cross-monotonic cost sharing method ξ, the following
cost sharing mechanism M(ξ) satisfies budget balance and group-strategyproofness: Initially, let S := U. If for each player
i ∈ S, the cost share ξ(i, S) is at most her bid bi, we stop. Otherwise, remove from S all players whose cost shares are larger
than their bids, and repeat. Eventually, let SM be the final player set and define the payments as xi(SM) := ξ(i, SM) for all
i ∈ SM . Jain and Vazirani [10] later observed that the result of Moulin and Shenker also carries over to approximately budget
balanced and cross-monotonic cost sharing methods.
Yet another fairness concept in cooperative game theory that we use in this paper is the β-core. A cost sharing method ξ
is in the β-core iff it is β-budget balanced and
∀S′ ⊆ S ⊆ U : ∑
i∈S′
ξ(i, S) ≤ C(S′).
2.2. Social welfare vs. social cost
Recall that we define the social welfare of a set S ⊆ U as u(S)− C(S), where u(S) :=∑i∈S ui. A cost sharing mechanismM is
said to be efficient if it selects a set SM of players thatmaximizes the social welfare (assuming truthful bidding). An alternative
measure of efficiency that we consider in this paper is social cost: Define the social cost of a set S ⊆ U as
Π (S) := u(U \ S)+ C(S).
A mechanism M is said to be α-approximate if it computes a final set SM of social cost at most α times the minimum over all
sets S ⊆ U, i.e., Π (SM) ≤ α · Π (S) for all S ⊆ U. Observe that for every set S ⊆ U, u(U) − Π (S) = u(S) − C(S). Since u(U) is a
constant, a set Sminimizes social cost iff it maximizes social welfare.
Roughgarden and Sundararajan [3] revealed a relation between the approximability of a Moulin mechanism M(ξ) and
a property of the cost sharing method ξ: Assume we are given an arbitrary order σ on a subset S ⊆ U of players, i.e.,
S = {i1, . . . , i|S|}, where ij ≺σ ik if and only if 1 ≤ j < k ≤ |S|. We define Sj ⊆ S as the (ordered) set of the first j players
of S according to the order σ. A cost sharing method ξ is α-summable if for every order σ and every subset S ⊆ U:
|S|∑
j=1
ξ(ij, Sj) ≤ α · C(S). (2)
The authors proved that the Moulin mechanismM(ξ) is (α+ β)-approximate and β-budget balanced if the underlying cost
sharing method ξ is α-summable and β-budget balanced. Moreover, they showed that max{α,β} is a lower bound on the
approximability of M(ξ).
In this paper, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. We define Hn to be the n-th harmonic number, i.e., Hn :=∑ni=1 1/i. As
n grows to infinity, Hn = log n+ γ, where γ ≈ 0.577 denotes the Euler–Mascheroni constant. Hence, Hn = Θ(log n) and we
use both values interchangeably. Unless stated otherwise, we denote by n the cardinality of the universe U.
3. A general lower bound on summability
In this section, we prove a lower bound of Ω(log n) on the summability of cost sharing methods, where n denotes the
number of players inU. Our lower boundholds for every optimizationproblemwhich contains a so-called cost stable instance.
Intuitively, we call an instance cost stable if it contains a significantly large player set whose cost does not deviate too much
from the cost of any of its subsets. This property is fulfilled by a variety of combinatorial optimization problems such as
facility location, Steiner tree, minimum makespan scheduling, etc. Together with the recent result of Roughgarden and
Sundararajan [3], our result shows that for all these problems, the approximability of Moulin mechanisms cannot be better
than Ω(log n).
Theorem 1. Consider an instance of a combinatorial optimization problem on a player set U inducing a cost function C. Suppose
that there is a set S ⊆ U of size |S| ≥ |U|/γ for some constant γ ≥ 1 such that
C(S′) ≥ 1
δ
· C(S)
for all S′ ⊆ S and some constant δ ≥ 1. Let ξ be a cost sharing method for this problem that satisfies the β-cost recovery condition.
Then, ξ is not α-summable for any α < Hdn/γe/(β · δ).
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that there exists an order σ on U such that
|S|∑
j=1
ξ(ij, Sj) ≥ Hdn/γe
β · δ · C(S),
where Sj is the set of the first j players in S and ij is the jth player of S (ordered according to σ).
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We construct σ by determining the sets Sj and players ij inductively as follows. Initially, set j = |S| and assign Sj = S. Now,
suppose we have determined sets S|S|, . . . , Sj. By an average argument, there must exist a player i ∈ Sj such that
ξ(i, Sj) ≥ C(Sj)
β · |Sj| =
C(Sj)
β · j ≥
C(S)
βδ · j ,
since ξ satisfies the β-cost recovery condition. The last inequality holds because Sj ⊆ S. Assign ij := i and Sj−1 := Sj \ {ij}.
Let S = {i1, . . . , i|S|} be the set of players in S ordered according to the order σ constructed above. We have
|S|∑
j=1
ξ(ij, Sj) ≥
(
1+ 1
2
+ · · · + 1|S|
)
· C(S)
βδ
≥ Hdn/γe
βδ
· C(S),
where we exploit that |S| ≥ n/γ and |S| ∈ N. 
This lower bound applies to many problems, as e.g. to the following ones:
Example 2 (Fixed-Tree Multicast Problem). Players are located at vertices of an undirected graph and wish to receive a
broadcasting service which is produced in a root vertex. The cost of serving a set of players U is the cost of a minimum
spanning tree containing U and the root. An instance fulfilling the conditions of the above theorem is the one in which all
players are located on the same vertex which is connected to the root by an edge of length 1. The lower bound for this
problem has been shown in [3].
Example 3 (Facility Location Problem). Players are located at vertices and wish to be connected to an open facility. Facilities
can be opened at a given subset of vertices. Here, a sample instance is the one in which there is only one vertex v at which
a facility may be opened, and all players are located directly on v. Then, the cost of a solution is independent of the number
of players and equal to the opening cost of the facility. This lower bound is tight, as has been shown in [18].
Another example for which Theorem 1 applies is the makespanmachine scheduling problem that we define in Section 4.
There, we show that the bound on summability is tight for this problem.
We remark that there are stronger lower bounds for e.g. the Steiner tree and Steiner forest problems [18].
4. Minimummakespan scheduling
We consider the classicalminimummakespan scheduling problem. We are given a set of n jobs N that have to be scheduled
onm identical machines. Each job i ∈ N has a non-negative processing time pi, which is the time needed to execute i on one of
themachines.We denote the completion time of job i by Ci. Everymachine can execute atmost one job at a time; preemption
of jobs is not allowed. The objective is to schedule all jobs in N on the mmachines such that the maximum completion time
maxi∈N Ci, also calledmakespan, is minimized. Following the naming scheme introduced by Graham et al. [34], this problem
is referred to as P| |Cmax.
In a game-theoretic variant of the machine scheduling problem, each job is associated with a player, who wants her job
to be processed on one of the m machines. We therefore identify the universe of players U with the set of jobs N. The cost
C(S) incurred to schedule all jobs in S is the minimummakespan. We are interested in designing a cost sharing mechanism
for the minimummakespan scheduling problem that is β-budget balanced and α-approximate for every possible instance.
Let pmax(S) denote the maximum processing time over all jobs in S. Define µ(S) as the average machine load, i.e.,
µ(S) :=∑i∈S pi/m. The following fact is well known (see, e.g., [35]).
Fact 4. For a given set S ⊆ U of jobs, let C(S) be the makespan of an optimal schedule for S. The following two inequalities hold:
(1) C(S) ≤ µ(S)+ (1− 1
m
) · pmax(S);
(2) C(S) ≥ max{µ(S), pmax(S)}.
4.1. Cross-monotonic cost shares
Bleischwitz and Monien [6] describe a cross-monotonic cost sharing method ξbm for the above machine scheduling
problem. We briefly review their cost sharing method.1
We call a job i largewith respect to S if pi = pmax(S) and small otherwise. Let `(S) be the number of large jobs in S. Given
a subset S ⊆ U of the jobs, we define the cost share of i ∈ S as:
ξbm(i, S) :=

pi
m
+ pi−µ(S)
`(S)
if pi = pmax(S) and pi > µ(S),
pi
m
otherwise.
(3)
The intuition is as follows: Every job gets a cost share of pi/m. If the average machine load µ(S) is less than the maximum
processing time pmax(S), every large job additionally obtains an equal share of the cost pmax(S) − µ(S). We summarize one
of the main results of Bleischwitz and Monien [6] in the following theorem.
1 At first sight, the cost shares that we state here differ from the ones defined by Bleischwitz and Monien in [6]. However, it can easily be verified that
both definitions are in fact equivalent; we feel that the definition we present here is more intuitive.
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Theorem 5 ([6]). ξbm is a (2m/(m + 1))-budget balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the minimum makespan
scheduling problem. Moreover, there is no β-budget balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing method ξ for this problem, for any
β < 2m/(m+ 1).
Albeit Theorem 5 proves that the Moulin mechanism M(ξbm), driven by the cost sharing method ξbm by Bleischwitz and
Monien, is optimal with respect to budget balance, we show below that it is far from being optimal with respect to social
cost. In fact, the social cost of the final set SM output by M(ξbm) can be as large as n/2 times the optimal social cost, where n
is the number of jobs in the universe U.
Lemma 6. For every n ∈ N, there exists an instance of the minimum makespan scheduling problem such that the cost sharing
method ξbm is not α-summable for any α < n/2.
Proof. It is sufficient to define an instance of the minimum makespan scheduling problem on n jobs and a permutation σ
for which the cost share sum in (2) with respect to ξbm is at least n/2 times the minimummakespan.
Let U := {i1, . . . , im} be an (ordered) set ofm jobs, wherem = n is the number of machines. Define the processing time of
job ij to be pij := 1+ (j− 1) for all j ∈ [m] and some small  > 0. Since the number of jobs equals the number of machines,
the makespan of an optimal assignment for U is C(U) = 1+ (m− 1).
Observe that the processing time of job ij, j ∈ [m], is maximum among all jobs in the set Sj = {i1, . . . , ij}, i.e., ij is large.
Furthermore, ij is the only large job in Sj and thus `(Sj) = 1. The average machine workload of Sj is
µ(Sj) = 1
m
j∑
l=1
pil =
1
m
(
j+ j(j− 1)
2
)
≤ 1+ (j− 1) = pmax(Sj).
Hence, the cost share that job ij obtains with respect to Sj is
ξbm(ij, Sj) = pij
m
+ pij − µ(Sj) = pij − µ(Sj−1),
where we define S0 := ∅. We obtain
ξbm(ij, Sj) = (1+ (j− 1))− 1
m
(
(j− 1)+ (j− 1)(j− 2)
2
)
≥ 1− j− 1
m
.
Therefore,
m∑
j=1
ξbm(ij, Sj) ≥ m− m(m− 1)2m =
m
2
+ 1
2
≥ m
2
(1+ (m− 1)) = m
2
· C(U),
where the last inequality holds if we choose  sufficiently small. 
Intuitively, this high summability gives voice to the fact that processing times exceeding the average workload µ(S) are
punished in an unfair manner: Instead of sharing the additional cost of pmax(S) − µ(S) among all jobs for which pi > µ(S),
only those jobs attaining the maximum processing time come up for it. We tackle this problem in the next section.
4.2. Approximate cost shares
We continue by proposing new cost shares ξbs for the minimummakespan scheduling problem that are still (2− 1/m)-
budget balanced and cross-monotonic, but concurrently (Hn + 1)-summable. This is tight in terms of both budget balance
and summability.
We use a different definition of small and large jobs here: A job i is largewith respect to S iff pi > µ(S) and small otherwise.
The cost share of a job i ∈ Swith respect to S is defined as
ξbs(i, S) :=

pi
m
+
pi∫
µ(S)
1
|{j ∈ S : pj ≥ t}| dt if pi > µ(S),
pi
m
otherwise.
(4)
Intuitively, every job receives a cost share of pi/m. A large job i obtains some additional cost share: for every time instant
t ∈ [µ(S), pi], i shares the cost of 1dt evenly with all other jobs in Swhose processing time is at least t.
We show that ξbs is a cost sharing method that satisfies cross-monotonicity, approximate budget balance and
summability.
Theorem 7. ξbs is a cross-monotonic, (2−1/m)-budget balanced and (Hn+1)-summable cost sharing method for the minimum
makespan scheduling problem.
Our cost sharing method is essentially tight: Bleischwitz and Monien [6] proved that no cross-monotonic cost sharing
method for this problem achieves a budget balance factor better than (2− 1/m). Moreover, using Theorem 1 we show (see
Corollary 11) that no cost sharing method that satisfies the β-cost recovery condition can be α-summable for any α < Hn/β.
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The proof of Theorem 7 follows from Lemmas 8–10 that are given below.
Lemma 8. ξbs is cross-monotonic.
Proof. Consider some set S ⊆ U and a job i ∈ S. We prove that if a new job j /∈ S is added to S, the cost share of i does not
increase.
If iwas small in S, then it remains small, and hence i’s cost share stays pi/m. If iwas large in S and becomes small in S∪{j},
then i’s cost share decreases to pi/m. It remains to show that the cost share of i does not increase if i stays large. Note that
by adding job j, the number of jobs whose processing time is at least t for some t ≥ 0 does not decrease. Moreover, we have
pi∫
µ(S)
1
|{j ∈ S : pj ≥ t}| dt ≥
pi∫
µ(S∪{j})
1
|{j ∈ S ∪ {j} : pj ≥ t}| dt,
since µ(S) ≤ µ(S ∪ {j}). This concludes the proof. 
We show next that the budget balance condition is satisfied.
Lemma 9. ξbs is (2− 1/m)-budget balanced.
Proof. With the cost share definition in (4) we have
∑
i∈S
ξ(i, S) =∑
i∈S
pi
m
+ ∑
i∈S: pi>µ(S)
pi∫
µ(S)
1
|{j ∈ S : pj ≥ t}| dt = µ(S)+
pmax(S)∫
µ(S)
1 dt = max{µ(S), pmax(S)}.
By Fact 4, C(S) ≥ max{µ(S), pmax(S)}, which proves competitiveness. Moreover, the cost shares satisfy (2 − 1/m)-cost
recovery because(
2− 1
m
)
·max{µ(S), pmax(S)} ≥ µ(S)+
(
1− 1
m
)
pmax(S) ≥ C(S),
where the last inequality follows from Fact 4. 
Finally, we prove that the cost shares fulfill (Hn + 1)-summability.
Lemma 10. ξbs is (Hn + 1)-summable.
Proof. Let σ be an arbitrary order on the jobs in U, and let S := {i1, . . . , i|S|}⊆ U be a subset of U ordered according to σ. First,
observe that
|S|∑
j=1
ξbs(ij, Sj) =
|S|∑
j=1
pij
m
+
pij∫
µ(S)
1
|{k ∈ Sj : pk ≥ t}| dt

≤
|S|∑
j=1
pij
m
+
pij∫
0
1
|{k ∈ Sj : pk ≥ t}| dt

≤ µ(S)+
|S|∑
j=1
pij∫
0
1
|{k ∈ Sj : pk ≥ t}| dt.
Fix a point in time t ∈ [0, pmax(S)]. Define r(t) as the number of jobs in S whose processing time is at least t. Using this
definition, we obtain
|S|∑
j=1
pij∫
0
1
|{k ∈ Sj : pk ≥ t}| dt =
pmax(S)∫
0
r(t)∑
r=1
1
r
dt =
pmax(S)∫
0
Hr(t) dt ≤ pmax(S) · H|S|.
Thus,
|S|∑
j=1
ξbs(ij, Sj) ≤ µ(S)+ pmax(S) · H|S| ≤ (Hn + 1) · C(S). 
Using Theorem 1, we can prove that Lemma 10 is essentially tight.
Corollary 11. Let ξ be a cost sharing method for the minimum makespan scheduling problem P|pi = 1|Cmax that satisfies the
β-cost recovery condition. Then the summability of ξ is no better than Hn/β.
Proof. Consider an instance that consists of n jobswith unit processing times andm := nmachines. Clearly, C(S) = 1 = C(U)
for all S ⊆ U. Theorem 1 now gives a lower bound of Hn/β. 
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5. A general lower bound on budget balance
While we have given cross-monotonic (2− 1/m)-budget balanced and (Hn + 1)-summable cost shares for the minimum
makespan scheduling problem,we identify a class of problems towhich no constantly budget balanced and cross-monotonic
cost sharingmethod exists in this section.We show that bothweighted completion time scheduling and average completion
time scheduling belong to this class, as well as all of their generalizations.
Consider a cost sharing game on a universe U of n players whose cost function C : 2U → R is non-decreasing,
i.e. C(S′) ≤ C(S) for all S′ ⊆ S ⊆ U. If there is an instance to the cost sharing game for which C(U) exceeds ∑i∈U C({i}) by
a factor of f (n), then the β-core of this game is empty for all β < f (n). This is due to the fact that players can never be
charged more than the cost they incur when being served alone, and therefore the players in a set S cannot pay more than∑
i∈S C({i}).
In the case of general (not necessarily non-decreasing) cost functions, using sets Ti containing i instead of the singletons
{i} itself can yield even better lower bounds. Intuitively, we choose the subset Ti ⊆ S for which the amount that player i ∈ S
is allowed to pay is smallest.
Theorem 12. Consider a cost sharing game on a universe U of n players and its cost function C. Let f : N→ R be a non-decreasing
function. Suppose there is a set S of size |S| ≥ |U|/γ for some constant γ ≥ 1, and arbitrary sets Ti ⊆ S with i ∈ Ti such that
C(S) ≥ f (|S|) ·∑
i∈S
C(Ti).
Then, there is no cost sharing method ξ in the β-core for any β < f ( n
γ
) for this game.
Proof. Assume that ξ is a cost sharing method in the β-core for this problem. First, the core property implies that the cost
share of player i in the set S ⊇ Ti is at most the cost induced by the set Ti, i.e. ξ(i, S) ≤∑j∈Ti ξ(j, S) ≤ C(Ti) for all i ∈ S. Second,
we assume C(S) ≥ f (|S|) ·∑i∈S C(Ti). The condition of β-cost recovery now implies that for every S ⊆ U:
β ≥ C(S)∑
i∈S
ξ(i, S)
≥
f (|S|) ·∑
i∈S
C(Ti)∑
i∈S
C(Ti)
≥ f
(
n
γ
)
. 
Since every cross-monotonic β-budget balanced cost sharing method is in the β-core, this theorem implies the same
lower bound on the budget balance factor of a cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the respective problem. In the
following two sections,we apply Theorem12 to theparallelmachine scheduling problemswith completion time and average
completion time objectives.
5.1. Minimum weighted completion time scheduling
In the minimum weighted completion time scheduling problem, we are given a set of n jobs N and m identical machines.
Each job i ∈ N has a processing time pi and a weight wi. The objective is to assign all n jobs to the mmachines such that the
total weighted completion time
∑
i∈N wiCi is minimized. In the cost sharing context, we define U := N as before, and let C be
the total weighted completion time of an optimal schedule. We show that the β-core of this scheduling problem is empty
for β < (n+ 1)/2, even for the unweighted single machine case with unit processing times.
Corollary 13. Consider the single machine minimum completion time scheduling problem with unit processing times 1|pi =
1|∑i Ci. There is no cost sharing method ξ that is in the β-core for any β < (n+ 1)/2 for this game.
Proof. Clearly, the cost of every singleton set {i}, i ∈ U, is C({i}) = 1. Set Ti := {i}. On the other hand, C(U) = n(n + 1)/2.
Thus,
C(U) ≥ n+ 1
2
·∑
i∈U
C(Ti),
and using Theorem 12 with S = U and f (n) = (n+ 1)/2 yields the claim. 
This lower bound carries over to all generalizations of the singlemachineminimumcompletion time scheduling problem,
e.g. to theminimum weighted flow time scheduling problem and problems with additional constraints such as release or due
dates. Note that the trivial cost sharing method ξwct(i, S) := wipi for all i ∈ S and S ⊆ U is cross-monotonic and n-budget
balanced for P| |∑i wiCi, as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 14. Consider theminimumweighted completion time scheduling problem P| |∑i wiCi. ξwct is a cross-monotonic n-budget
balanced cost sharing method for this problem.
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Proof. ξwct is obviously cross-monotonic. It is competitive since pi ≤ Ci for every job i ∈ S and all S ⊆ U.
To show n-cost recovery, we first consider the single machine case. Take an optimal schedule and number the jobs
accordingly. Smith [36] proved that if job i is scheduled before job j in an optimal schedule, i.e. i < j, then pi/wi ≤ pj/wj.
Thus, either pi ≤ pj or wi > wj (or both) are true, and the following inequality holds for all i < j:
wjpi ≤ max{wipi,wjpj} ≤ wipi + wjpj.
Using this, we can bound the cost of an optimal schedule for a set S ⊆ U by
|S|∑
j=1
wjCj =
|S|∑
j=1
wj ·
(
j∑
i=1
pi
)
=
|S|∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
wjpi ≤
|S|∑
j=1
(
j−1∑
i=1
(wipi + wjpj)+ wjpj
)
=
|S|∑
j=1
(
j · wjpj + (|S| − j)wjpj) = |S| · |S|∑
j=1
wjpj ≤ n ·
|S|∑
j=1
ξwct(j, S),
which proves n-cost recovery for the single machine case.
For the general case, consider the set Sk ⊆ S of jobs that are scheduled onmachine k ∈ [m] in an optimal schedule. Clearly,
the schedule formachine k is optimal for the corresponding singlemachine problem on the set of jobs Sk, for which the above
inequality holds. Summing up over all machines, we obtain∑
j∈S
wjCj =
∑
k∈[m]
∑
j∈Sk
wjCj ≤
∑
k∈[m]
n ·∑
j∈Sk
ξwct(j, Sk) = n ·
∑
j∈S
ξwct(j, S). 
5.2. Minimum average completion time scheduling
In theminimum average completion time scheduling problem, the setting is as above, but with the objective of minimizing
the total averageweighted completion time, i.e. C(S) =∑i∈S wiCi/|S| for all S ⊆ U. In classical machine scheduling, where an
optimal (or approximate) solution for the whole set U of players is sought, the problems with average weighted completion
time andweighted completion time objectives coincide, since the objectives only differ by a constant factor of |U|. However,
during the run of a Moulin mechanism, the size of the current player set varies, and thus |S| can no more be seen as a
constant. As a matter of fact, due to the division by |S|, the cost function is not monotone for this game, as the following
example shows:
Example 15. Consider an instance on a singlemachine and three jobs {1, 2, 3}with processing times pi = i and unitweights.
The average completion time is 3 if only job 3 is scheduled, (1+4)/2 = 2.5 if jobs 1 and 3 are scheduled, and (1+3+6)/3 > 3
if all three jobs are scheduled. Hence, the cost of an optimal schedule can increase as well as decrease when a job is added
to the scheduled set.
For this reason, we need a slightly more elaborated instance with non-uniform processing times to show that the β-core
of this game is empty for β < (n+ 4)/8. Nevertheless, the lower bound holds even for the unweighted single machine case.
Corollary 16. Consider the single machine minimum average completion time scheduling problem 1| |∑i Ci/n. There is no cost
sharing method ξ that is in the β-core for any β < (n+ 4)/8 for this game.
Proof. Let U = S ∪˙ L be a set of n jobs, where |S| = n/2 − 1 and |L| = n/2 + 1; we call the jobs in S small and those in L
large. Define pi :=  for all i ∈ S, and pi := 1 for all i ∈ L. The optimal cost for every singleton set {i}, i ∈ S, is C({i}) = . Set
Ti := {i} for all small jobs i ∈ S. For the large jobs i ∈ L, set Ti := S ∪ {i}. In an optimal schedule for Ti, first all small jobs in S
are processed and finally the large job i. The cost of an optimal schedule is thus
C(Ti) = 1|Ti|
( |S|∑
j=1
j · + (|S| · + 1)
)
≤ 2
n
(
1+ n
(
n
8
+ 1
2
))
.
We obtain∑
i∈U
C(Ti) ≤
(
n
2
− 1
)
· +
(
n
2
+ 1
)(2
n
(
1+ n
(
n
8
+ 1
2
)))
≤ n+ 2
n
(
1+ n
(
n
8
+ 1
))
. (5)
Define ′ := n(n/8+ 1). On the other hand,
C(U) ≥ (
n
2 + 1)( n2 + 2)
2n
= (n+ 2)(n+ 4)
8n
. (6)
Combining inequalities (5) and (6), we obtain
C(U) ≥ n+ 4
8(1+ ′) ·
∑
i∈U
C(Ti).
By Theorem 12, we obtain a lower bound of β ≥ (n + 4)/(8(1 + ′)) for any cost sharing method in the β-core. The claim
now follows by choosing  sufficiently small. 
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Note that the trivial cost sharing method ξact(i, S) := wipi/n for all i ∈ S and S ⊆ U is cross-monotonic and n-budget
balanced for P| |∑i wiCi/n.
Lemma 17. Consider the minimum average weighted completion time scheduling problem P| |∑i wiCi/n. ξact is a cross-
monotonic n-budget balanced cost sharing method for this problem.
Proof. ξact is obviously cross-monotonic. It is competitive since wipi/n ≤ wiCi/|S| for every job i ∈ S and all S ⊆ U. The proof
of n-cost recovery is analogous to the non-average case.
On a single machine, Smith’s rule still holds for every optimal schedule for S since the average cost is only a constant
factor times the non-average cost for fixed S. Thus, the cost of an optimal schedule for a set S ⊆ U is bounded by
|S|∑
j=1
wjCj/|S| ≤
|S|∑
j=1
wjpj = n ·
|S|∑
j=1
ξact(j, S).
For the general case, again, considering the sets Sk ⊆ S for all machines k ∈ [m] and summing up yields∑
j∈S
wjCj/|S| ≤
∑
k∈[m]
∑
j∈Sk
wjCj/|Sk| ≤
∑
k∈[m]
n ·∑
j∈Sk
ξact(j, Sk) = n ·
∑
j∈S
ξact(j, S),
proving n-cost recovery. 
6. Conclusion
We proved that the efficiency of Moulin mechanisms is not approximable within less than logarithmic factors even with
the new social cost efficiencymeasure. Our lower boundholds if the underlying optimization problemsatisfies a certain cost-
stability property. This reduces the hope of finding truly efficient cost sharing mechanisms for these problems. On the other
hand, the new efficiency measure allows us to characterize cost sharing mechanisms in terms of their best polylogarithmic
approximation factor.
Although most of the previously known cross-monotonic and approximately budget balanced cost sharing methods for
combinatorial optimization problems turned out to simultaneously achieve the best possible social cost efficiency [3,17–
19], our work reveals that different cost sharingmethods achieving the same budget balance factor may indeed behave very
differently with respect to approximate social cost.
We studied cost sharing methods for makespan and completion time related scheduling problems. Our results
demonstrate that the tractability of these problems in a cost sharing context heavily depends on the respective objective
function. Our negative result on the budget balance factor for cross-monotonic cost sharing methods motivates the
investigation of alternative cost sharing models; perhaps with a weaker notion of truthfulness for cooperative games.
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